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Abstract 
Dialogic pedagogy is an approach to education influenced by Bakhtin, Freire, and others. It is an approach that is 
critical of conventional education, which tends to be didactic and alienating to students. Student engagement is made 
central as dialogue takes priority over standardization and core cannons of content. Dialogic pedagogy also 
emphasizes the importance of communities of learners where teachers are co-learners along with students as all 
parties work on problems together. I seek to raise challenges to Dialogic Pedagogy and these come from scholars 
working on the “conduct of everyday life” and from Charles Taylor’s notion of “strong evaluations”. The conduct of 
everyday life involves a focus on first-person subjectivities with an eye to their constitution in social and power 
relations. Strong evaluations enhance this discussion by addressing how people can engage in decisions that involve 
weighing options about the qualitative kind of person one is. I outline how education involves a conduct of everyday 
life where strong evaluations are promoted. Taking such an approach to education grounds two challenges to dialogic 
pedagogy. One challenge is that students are reticent to engage in strong evaluations and the modern identity is one 
disposed to disengagement. The converse challenge is that student engagement entails pedagogical eros, which is 
easily converted into power and abuse by a pedagogue.  
James (Jim) Cresswell is an Associate Professor in Psychology and Behavioural Sciences at Booth 
University College, Canada. His work has been supported by organizations such as the Social Science & 
Humanities Research Counsel, Templeton Foundation, and Murdoch Charitable Trust. His work is largely 
influenced by the philosophy of Mikhail Bakhtin and cultural psychology. Of special interest is Bakhtin’s 
work on aesthetics in relation to language and how it can enhance current work in education, philosophy 
of mind, cognitive science of religion, and immigration.  
 
Introduction 
Before coming to be involved in DPJ, I studied critical/cultural psychology with a focus on the 
work of Mikhail Bakhtin (e.g. Cresswell, 2011). This work addressed the dialogicality of personhood, but 
being an academic working at teaching-focused universities has made education an important topic of 
study for me. In this editorial, I draw on my background and my comparatively recent experience with DPJ 
to speculate about two challenges facing dialogical pedagogy. The objective of this editorial is to outline 
how disengagement and pedagogical eros are two issues that we need to think about engaging in 
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dialogic pedagogy. I seek to set the ground to raise issues that we ought to be talking about. Doing so 
requires that I first outline the background perspective that grounds the challenges I present. This 
background involves a discussion of scholarship on the conduct of everyday life (see Dreier, 2016) and 
Charles Taylor’s (1989, 1999) notion of strong evaluations. It will then be followed by a brief synopsis of 
dialogic pedagogy and to so show resonance among the forgoing. Doing so sets the stage for my 
challenge to dialogic pedagogy.  
Critical/Cultural Psychology & the Classroom 
Conduct of Everyday Life 
The “conduct of everyday life” is a phrase originating from an interdisciplinary group of 
researchers. Although this approach emerges in psychology from the work of Holzkamp (2013) and is 
promoted largely by a psychologist named Ole Dreier (2016), its interdisciplinary roots speak to a wide 
range of disciplines including education. Dreier argues that the conduct of everyday life involves the 
exploration of human subjectivity. This approach is one that points out how researchers can lose sight of 
everyday subjectivity in the development of theory and so presupposed theory or specified research 
interests in the industry of academy can set researchers’ interests above that of those they study. 
Scholars working on the conduct of everyday life avoid any distinction between talking about a theory 
dealing with the conduct of everyday life and the conduct of everyday life itself. While such scholars are 
not against theorizing per se, the do critique theorizing from a third person perspective. No person can 
escape the conduct of everyday life and theorize about others without personal involvement. It involves 
examining what it is like to live life from the perspective of one living it.  
Examining the first person perspective is important but it does not follow that the conduct of 
everyday life is not just about individual subjectivities. Dreier (2016) points out that the first person 
perspective is one of a situated subject. Subjectivities are constitutionally situated in sociocultural 
contexts and so, at a very basic level, this situatedness pertains to interpersonal relationships. Højholt & 
Schraube (2016), for example, argue that it is important to take into account how people produce and 
reproduce their lives collaboratively through interpersonal activities embedded in sociocultural, economic, 
and political contains. It is through constrained activities like talking, playing, working, and so on that 
people engage with others and build their subjectivities. Subjectivities are co-created together with others 
and so examining them includes examining the interpersonal practices by which people conduct everyday 
life. 
Considering the first person perspective also includes the loci of the reification of social 
structuring because interpersonal interactions are where such structure is constituted. Dreier (2016) 
reviews the conduct of everyday life to address how social and interpersonal practices are intimately 
entwined with what we often consider to be wider social structures. Social structures are held in place 
through appropriated ideology and practices that reify the machinations of power. Persons who 
participate in social practices participate in such structures that entail differences in power and control. 
Looking at such social practices allows us to grasp how people live in first person subjectivities that are 
not merely individualistic or independent. It includes examining the establishment of joint arrangements 
that enable such social structure to be continually reified. They become routines that structure and reify 
more extensive social arrangements and so it is important to examine the first person perspective for this 
reason. Considering the conduct of everyday life highlights the social structure of practice in everyday life 
and therein sheds light on structure of society as it manifests in the arrangements of everyday life.  
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One of the strengths of work in the conduct of everyday life is the acknowledgment that the notion 
of the situation – singular, objective, and unambivalent – is naive. Dreier (2016) argues that the singular 
notion of situation is an abstraction that is convenient for academics but it can’t be studied in singular 
terms if we can look at the conduct of everyday life. A given context may involve multiple situations 
insofar as there can be competing realities and worlds at stake at one point in time. Interests and 
perspectives are not just differences in something simple like shallow opinions insofar as they gesture 
towards societal tensions and social problems (Højholt & Schraube, 2016). Dreier (2016) therein argues 
that such differences in the concrete practices of everyday life entail intra-subjective discourse enmeshed 
with everyday concerns. They can also be clues to how one can look to change by considering how 
human beings take part in reproducing and changing society. As such, the conduct of everyday life 
involves considering how people navigate among complex realities to exercise agency (see also Højholt 
& Schraube, 2016).  
A result is that the conduct of everyday life involves looking at how people manage such 
complexities simultaneously as well as diachronically. It is here that we see the importance of the notion 
of conducting insofar as moving through spheres of life includes developing practices in many forms of 
life (Dreier, 2016). Such forms are infused with their own power structures and ideological agendas, 
which means that life is replete with discontinuities that people have to deal with. The conduct of 
everyday life involves bridging across spheres of life as people attempt to coordinate life with others. 
Sometimes such attempts are successful and sometimes they are not because attempts at such bridging 
can be more or less successful as some ideologies are rejected as others are recapitulated. Such 
dynamic tensions are part of conducting life in a way that one is able to get along with others well enough, 
one hopes! Of course, this not always possible and ruptures happen. 
What is interesting about the conduct of everyday life is that people often navigate complexities in 
ways that show creativity – satisfying contradictory ideologies in unique ways so that people are not 
socially programmed automatons. There is thereby a kind of agency that we see in the conduct of 
everyday life insofar as people are able to transcend a given situational set of demands and act in unique 
ways. People establish routines to accomplish living in ways that are subject to decisions and choice via 
such transcendence. The different inequalities and tensions are managed in the course of accomplishing 
a modus operandi that fits with one’s interlocutors. The advantage of the conduct of everyday life is that it 
links spheres of activity and allows us to talk about how people individually coordinate pursuits from one 
place to another among and with different people. 
Work on the conduct of everyday life is good because it focusses our attention on how education 
involves the conduct of everyday life. It shows us how first person subjectivities matter and yet does not 
diminish an important discussion of power, authority, and agentic resitance. In so doing, the conduct of 
everyday life entails learning as situated in multiple zones of conflict where people are agents that 
uniquely shape their lives. Below, I will further elaborate on this work in light of education, but I first want 
to turn to Charles Taylor (1989, 1999) because his ideas add to this work by offering further insight 
through his notion of strong evaluations.  
Strong Evaluations 
Taylor’s (1989) Sources of the Self traces the sociohistorical development of self. He has 
attempted to discuss human experience in general and I have found his work to be, at times, 
ethnocentric. His arguments fit well with a western intellectual tradition but it remains unclear how well it 
works elsewhere. Like most intellectuals who take on large topics like the development of the modern 
self, he opens himself to the critique of exception, which is when one can always think of some people 
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group or exemption to his claims. This challenge notwithstanding, his work has been highly influential and 
generative because he does articulate important themes. He opens up important themes worth 
discussing as he carefully brings together a wide range of social and philosophical trends. Rather than 
dismissing Taylor immediately, I argue that he provides a voice that can enhance our dialogue about 
dialogic pedagogy.  
Taylor (1989) opens with a discussion about how being a self is inseparable from existing in a 
space of moral issues. This discussion is about how humans can be deeply moral and compelled by 
things that matter deeply to them. Human life can be about engaging with an experience of struggling with 
what is right or good and this discussion is grounded in what he calls “strong evaluations”. Sources does 
not really spell out with a lot of clarity what this phrase means, but it is carefully articulated ten years later. 
Taylor (1999), therein, draws on a well-worn philosophical distinction between first and second order 
desires. A first-order desire is to want something like a desire to simply feel pleasure from an outcome, 
choosing between sweat treats for example. We want our selves, however, to be dispositionally inclined 
to things that would be deemed as good and admirable and this wanting is a second-order desire. He 
points out that what is distinctively human is the capacity to evaluate our desires insofar as we can see 
some desires as good and others as bad. We can desire that we have certain first-order desires over 
others and this is what amounts to a second-order desire. That is, a second-order desire is to have a 
desire whose object is to have a certain desire (first-order desire). People can want themselves to be 
inclined towards things that they evaluate as good and admirable – whatever that means within a 
particular framework.  
Taylor’s (1999) discussion of first and second order desires sets a background for explaining 
what is meant by strong and weak evaluations. Weak evaluations are concerned with basic outcomes 
where an option is considered good if it satisfies a first-order desire. A weak evaluation means that 
something is desired and an option is good to take if the desire is satisfied. Choosing one option over 
another simply enables us to have our desires met and so options often preclude each other. Taylor calls 
these weak evaluations because an option is good so long as a desire is met and so the depth and 
quality of deliberation are not terribly relevant. Strong evaluations are concerned with quality of motivation 
in a sense that resonates more with second-order desires. Instead of assessing options on the base of 
whether a first-order desire is satiated, it is about assessing the qualitative worth of different desires as 
they relate to outcomes. An outcome is considered good on a much more complicated basis because we 
can include our considerations of whether the desires entwined with the outcomes are desires that we 
want to dispositionally embody. The notion of good is therein accompanied by some other evaluative 
terms and considerations. The action one chooses may or may not preclude other options as it may not 
necessarily involve incompatible decisions. To evaluate strongly involves wanting to be a certain kind of 
person or living a certain kind of life. We characterize such ‘certainties’ in a complex interconnected web 
of meanings and desires. This is the moral space in which Taylor (1989) earlier describes as essential to 
humans. It involves largely implicit qualitative distinctions of worth that are entwined with our decisions 
about what one ought to do and what one ought to be. The fact that such deliberations are more ridden 
with conflict and they are not contingent on merely satisfying a desire, Taylor calls them strong 
evaluations.  
Taylor (1989, 1999) is clear that evaluations are integrally entwined with our participation in 
communities. Much like Dreier (2016) argues that subjectivity is constituted in sociality, Taylor (1999) 
argues for a communitarian approach. The latter turns to a discussion on language to explain how the 
experiences that are entwined with strong evaluation are socioculturally constituted. Language is not 
owned by any particular person and is used in a way recognizable by a community. It is a normative 
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phenomenon. Taylor notes that language does not just label experience because we cannot just change 
the label of an experience at a whim. Language is constitutive of experience and we draw on language to 
articulate our experience, leaving us with a sense of when we have got the articulation correct and when 
we have not. Language provides a symbolic medium by which higher and lower goals can be articulated 
and constituted. Without a communally shaped language there would be no way to articulate the kinds of 
choices that are at stake in life. In fact, the language that we learn to speak along with others is a 
constitutive force that shapes what counts as good or right. First order desires are not, thereby, merely 
something like biological drives. A characterization of such basic desire betrays the complexity of human 
experience. They are more like seemingly on-hand inclinations and so desire, in the case of strong and 
weak evaluations, is not about a simple dichotomy between biology and cultural sophistication. It is on 
such grounds that Taylor (1989) argues that doing without such linguistically constituted frameworks is 
impossible for us. He argues that stepping outside of frameworks is stepping outside of what is essential 
to us.  
Taylor (1999) is well aware of how multicultural pluralism means that desires differ markedly from 
culture to culture and community to community (1999, see also 1994). He writes that “… frameworks 
today are problematic. This vague term points towards a relatively open disjunction of attitudes. What is 
common to them all is the sense that no framework is shared by everyone, can be taken for granted as 
the framework tout court, can sink to the phenomenological status as unquestionable fact” (1989, p. 17). 
Different communities would have different frameworks and so multicultural pluralism means that it is 
unlikely that there is a framework shared by everyone. People are often presented with goods that 
challenge and displace others. Weak evaluations are easier when there is not such pluralistic challenge 
to what feels ‘natural’. In contrast, strong evaluations involve evaluative contrasts ranging over desires 
grounded in different communities of practice. It becomes hard to sustain a consistent moral ontology 
because such contrasts lead to uncertainties on our own beliefs. Such conditions lead to a reflexive 
stance which is quite radical in the sense that the kinds of tensions addressed in the conduct of everyday 
life have serious existential weight. As such, strong evaluations are not merely “A” being more desirable 
than “B” on the basis of one framework. Such conduct of everyday life is about articulating and deciding 
among such frameworks. Thus, a strong evaluation is a condition of articulacy that involves a deeper 
sense of the world because it characterizes motivation at a greater depth. Strong evaluations are about 
the deeply experienced tensions that come from learning language and, as noted above, the contrast of 
subjectivities entwined with participation in multiple communities.   
Just like researchers interested in the conduct of everyday life have an interest in agency, Taylor 
(1989, 1999) shows a similar interest. Pluralism and second-order desires or evaluating desires is 
essential to human agency. One is potentially in a place where there are multiple available options that 
are part and parcel with the multiple zones of conflict spelled out in the conduct of everyday life. Here is 
where strong evaluations begin in the sense that there can be competing moral ontologies as there are 
different lifeworlds juxtaposed. There is not a view from nowhere that is taken when making decisions but 
rather something like an intrapsychic dynamic of competing subjectivities. Such experience is entwined 
with strong evaluations and is necessary to our notion of the human subject conducting everyday life. 
Taylor argues that an agent who cannot evaluate desires lacks the reflective capacity which we associate 
with the human agent. Not exercising such evaluations means to have no depth essential to humanity. 
An agent is thereby responsible for what he does and for the evaluations that he makes in two 
senses. In one sense, one is responsible to others in one’s life. Second-order desires are not just 
seemingly given like first-order desires because second order desires entail more existentially challenging 
acts of responsibility, relative to weak evaluations. This sense means that the choices people enact have 
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consequences for how we get along with others and the continued fit people have (or don’t have) with our 
families political, economic, and/or religious communities. Taylor (1991) draws on the Bakhtinian notion of 
answerability to show that our lives are constantly responding to others as we answer to them. This 
quality of the conduct of everyday life is what Dreier (2016) and others are getting at with the discussion 
of how we negotiate the conduct of our everyday life in the midst of tensions. 
In another sense, one is responsible to be a strong evaluator and Taylor (1999) argues that 
strong and weak evaluations introduce different kinds of selves. One can reduce deliberation to weak 
evaluation and such would involve conducting everyday life as a subject who is a simple weigher. It is 
possible to make decision based on caprice and shallowly inconsiderate of the bigger questions and 
meanings involved in options. It can involve simple decisions where one dismisses obligations to diverse 
communities as one goes with whatever feels simply right. In a tragically ironic kind of manner, Taylor 
argues that this sort of decision making is a hallmark or neoliberal individualism: 
Of course the independence can become a very shallow affair, in which masses of people each try to express 
their individuality in stereotyped fashion. It is a critique that has often been made of modern consumer society 
that it tends to breed a herd of conformist individuals. This is indeed a mockery of the pretention of the culture. 
But just for that reason we can’t conclude that the existence of a traditional culture of independence itself 
empties individuality of its meaning. (1989, p. 40).  
In being a simple weigher who does not engage in strong evaluations, one can become shallow 
and conform to whatever consumer culture prompts, which therein strips one of authentic agency. One 
does not find creative solutions to transcend community and be unique (see Cresswell, 2011), which 
means people can be relegated to being part of ‘the herd’. There is still a deeper meaning entailed in 
weak evaluations but it is obfuscated in the denial of responsibility to conduct everyday life on the basis of 
strong evaluations. What is articulated in Sources is that we run the danger of falling into weak 
evaluations as a mode of living in contrast to the possibility of engaging life at the level of strong 
evaluations. The conduct of life can be differentiated as strong or weak and this is how our understanding 
of the conduct of everyday life is enriched by Taylor. 
Implications for Education 
The forgoing has clear relevance to the topic of education, as described by Schraube & Marvakis 
(2016). They point out how the conduct of everyday life entails understanding learning as participation in 
social practices. To understand this conceptualization of learning it is helpful to articulate the perspective 
against whom they position themselves, which is what they call the “transfer model of learning”. The 
transfer model represents learning as the transfer of information from the teacher to the learner. A 
problem that they identify with this model is that learning is treated like a direct result of teaching. 
Readers of DPJ will be familiar with how understanding and learning is more than a direct result of 
information transmitted from a teacher (see below). Fixed procedures for teaching are insufficient 
because learning is not a one-way process. Teachers and students form a reciprocal relationship where 
qualities and the conduct of everyday life in students bears on the process. 
In contrast to the transfer model, Schraube & Marvakis (2016) explain that the conduct of 
everyday life involves an active relational contextual approach to learning. It involves subjectivities 
constituted in shared practices and interpersonal interactions as described above. Learning is a 
developing ability to practice subjectivities that one theretofore did not know. Schraube & Marvakis (2016) 
thereby argue that one cannot reduce learning to a knowledge of content required to pass a test. 
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Demonstrating learning involves a stylistic appropriation of social practices that amounts to social labor. 
Situated learning anchors activities of learning in the world and so demonstrations of learning are about 
explaining world in and through participation in social practices. It is about participating in action 
possibilities that are contextually entwined with social meanings of the students and instructors instead of 
merely passive reception of content. 
Because the conduct of everyday life involves a reciprocal relationship among students and 
instructors, Schraube & Marvakis (2016) argue that education is not neutral or free of conflict. The 
collision of social practices and different subjectivities in education means that it is a place of contested 
meanings. The conflictual character of education opens up possibilities for learnings wherein the conduct 
of everyday life and be shaped and reshaped. Conflict is taken seriously and acknowledged in contrast to 
the transfer model wherein it is denied through the masking power of a pedagogue. Students and 
teachers can take this “defensive mode” of learning that overtly curtails development and change in the 
conduct of everyday life. It reifies a separation of learning from everyday activities predicated on 
presupposed separation in society that does not work in the conduct of everyday life where people 
actually integrate diachronically and synchronically. In contrast, learning can involve moving forward and 
reshaping how one deals with everyday problems and subject matter. This conduct of learning is what 
Schraube & Marvakis refer to as expansive learning.  Students and teachers can be “affinitive” where 
they work on problems and seem to come to solutions. This solution is temporary, however, as it is 
possible to be redefined and open up problems for new forms of synthesis and new possibilities. It is in 
this way that education is a cooperative endeavor in the conduct of everyday life.  It leaves us with a 
model of education that is not just transference of information, but it is a conduct of everyday life. In short, 
it gives us a good sense of education in terms of what is happening on the ground.  
Considering the conduct of everyday life involves learning situated in multiple zones of conflict 
where agents uniquely shape their lives and Taylor shows us how this includes the potential for strong 
evaluations. The first person subjectivities of students matter and not all subjectivities are the same. 
Some can be reminiscent of weak evaluations where subjectivities involve decisions as if they are first 
order desires. While not succumbing to the transfer model of education, this sort of education could be 
masked as “student engagement” where it tunes into student interests and first order desires. Much like 
the learner-centered trade literature that is often about seducing students into learning by cleaver tricks to 
appeal to their interests, education can be about appealing to first-order desires. “Getting students 
interest and keeping it” (Bain, 2004) can look like engagement because it appeals for first-order desires. 
Taylor inspires awareness of how weak evaluations can be promoted with the result of herds that 
seemingly do their own thing while in fact conforming to whatever neoliberal consumerism marketing 
genius designs. 
Education can, alternatively, offer a conduct of everyday life entailing subjectivities of strong 
evaluations. This model of student engagement involves retaining student experience and not negating it 
as the transfer model entails. It does not fetishize personal experience by playing to first-order desires 
insofar as real competing moral ontologies are brought into a zone of conflict. Engagement involves 
agency in the sense of strong evaluations where instructors challenge students as the former are 
themselves challenged. Risking frameworks is part of the conduct of everyday life in education and it is 
for the instructor as well as the students. Judgment and critique are part of education and not just 
validation of one’s experience for its own sake. 
The conduct of everyday educational life includes strong evaluations and the realities of power 
and authority. Just like the conduct of everyday life involves power and authority and the negotiation 
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thereof, including strong evaluations entails such negotiations. It is important to bear in mind that strong 
evaluations involve constant weighing and testing of options. They are not compatible with monologic 
tendencies where one authoritative discourse tends towards prevailing at the expense of all others. This 
resonates with the well-worn challenges that we see in the likes of Freire’s (2002) challenging authority in 
dialogical education and Postman’s (1971) admonition to embody teaching as a subversive activity. 
Strong evaluations mean knowing risk and what happens when power and authority are violated. It can 
involve choosing to face the wrath or not, but it is a choice made as a strong evaluation and so engages 
communities and deals with ideology. 
Dialogic Pedagogy 
Dialogic pedagogy partly has its roots in the Freire’s (2000) Pedagogy of the Oppressed and 
related approaches that critique conventional educational practices (e.g. Shor, 1987; Shor & Freire, 
1987). Matusov’s (2009) Journey into Dialogic Pedagogy stays faithful to this critique through a careful 
discussion of Socratic dialogues. Matusov notes how Socrates often starts with “pedagogical diagnostics” 
where he unearths what someone thinks in order to correct them. Such a pedagogical style has found its 
way into current educational praxis where fostering conversation tends to morph into testing curriculum 
and prescribed cannons of information (see Hayes & Matusov, 2005). It involves testing for knowledge 
about information divorced from everyday experience. The Bakhtinian roots of dialogic pedagogy highlight 
how the conventional approach amounts to a chronotope where knowledge and skills are treated as 
immutable across people and across practices and situations (see Matusov, 2015b).  
The results of conventional schooling can be quite negative as Matusov (2009) writes:  
I argue that monologic pedagogy; prevalent in many conventional classrooms, is responsible for at 
least three major mutually related problems: alienation of students from formal education, irrelevancy of the 
school curricula for societal and personal development, crisis of teacher authority. (p. 145).  
As a teacher creates an illusion of certainty where all other answers are bad, students learn to suppress 
what they really think in order to cooperate with a teacher’s agenda. The alienation of students is seen in 
how presenting correct answers does not mean that students will accept them. Shor (1987) pointed out 
that students learn to “sit tight” and “learn the score” in terms of how to play the education game, which 
also entraps teachers as well. Students can be disciplined into remaining with an educational curriculum 
in a way that defines their experience as irrelevant (see Matusov & Miyazaki, 2014). A result is that a 
conventional school chronotope is one that values unconditional cooperation (see also Matusov, 2015a). 
The issue of teacher authority is one of eliciting cooperation and so the ontological authority of teachers 
pertains only to the classroom game.  
Dialogic pedagogy attempts to offer an alternative approach to conventional schooling. Hayes 
and Matusov (2005) note how dialogue does not diagnose students to reveal errors or lend itself to be 
used as a technique to make students friends in a way that seduces them to presupposed truths (see 
Shor & Freire, 1987). One of the key points that emerges is that authentic dialogical relations in the 
classroom is the non-transparency of student consciousnesses (see Matusov & Miyazaki, 2014). 
Students cannot be known a priori by the teacher and so conditions must be set to enable the former’s 
experiences to manifest in a mode other than the detection of error. Such conditions mean that students’ 
positions are accepted as legitimate and teachers may not know the meaning of students’ work without 
dialogue and orientation. For example, Elkadar (2015) discusses the issue of multicultural education and 
how students’ voices can be suppressed. The politicizing of multicultural education effectively makes it 
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monologic and suppresses student agency. In contrast, Elkadar argues that dialogic education promotes 
student agency by welcoming resistance. Student agency emerges when teachers respect all voices (not 
just politically correct ones) because dialogue then becomes possible. Dialogic pedagogy therein involves 
an attempt to promote students’ responsive action in class and this is very different from mere 
cooperativeness. In short, dialogic pedagogy follows inspiration from Shor (1987) that teachers interrupt 
ordinary expectations of what class structure should be in order to create an authentic dialogue. 
One of the chief ways that such interruptions occur is through a suspension of defined 
educational ends/standardization and a turn to problem-based learning. Matusov (2009) notes that 
prescribed end points contradict open-ended spirit of dialogue needed for authentic student engagement 
insofar as dialogue demands its own emergent endpoints (see also Matusov & Miyazaki, 2014). Similarly, 
Nissen (2015) notes how a focus on standardization degrades the relevance of everyday human 
complexities. He argues that authentic dialogue involves sense-making practices that occupy 
interlocutors. Such sense-making in a milieu of an ill-defined problem lends to a communal constitution of 
ideas: a collectivity that establishes its own knowledge and gives students a voice. Where mass higher 
education has become largest warehouse for the institutional educational end-game to be played (see 
chapter one of Shor, 1987), suspending definitive standards leads to place where students can be 
personally engaged. 
Matusov (2009) argues that what goes hand-in-hand with the suspension of standardized ends is 
a problem-based learning. For example, Arya and Parker (2015) address climate change discussions 
among youth in order to demonstrate problem-based learning. The students learned how to evaluate 
evidence through engaging with each other on the problem of how to address climate change. The efforts 
of the teacher were not directed at teaching principles about climate change because they were focused 
on fostering student dialogue about a problem. The turn to problem-based learning is a continuance of 
ideas seen in Freire and Shor, who argue that teachers need to choose problems that come from 
students’ cultures (see especially Shor & Freire, 1987). This turn is a response to the growing 
monologicity emerging from the way that mass education has brought low culture of everyday life into 
contact with the traditionally high culture of “genteel” academe (see Shor, 1987). Dialogic pedagogy 
entails the notion that low culture is as valuable as any other form of life when it comes to learning. What 
matters is raising problems drawn from everyday life because a teacher cannot assume that all 
participants are automatically or non-problematically interested in a problem formulated in traditional 
education. Just as life involves solving problems, education can be about solving living problems. Instead 
of predefined ends, problem solving in the classroom becomes like everyday life where goals and the 
problem itself can be redefined (see Matusov, 2015a&b).  
Suspension of defined educational ends/standardization and a turn to problem-based learning set 
the conditions for what is called “ontological dialogue” in dialogic pedagogy. Drawing on the Bakhtinian 
distinction between authoritative and internally persuasive discourse, Matusov (2009) points out that 
conventional authoritative pedagogy is about knowledge removed from life. Such authoritative dialogue 
amounts to an epistemological form focused on a cannon of information. In contrast, internally persuasive 
discourse relates to an experience where one’s being is engaged as one is personally drawn into the 
dialogue.  Dialogue is thereby ontological and such learning cannot be separated from people because it 
is part of what defines them (see also Matusov & Miyazaki, 2014). Where epistemological dialogue does 
not involve ontological meaning for participants, ontological dialogue involves a personal urgency 
because one is dealing with issues that are deeply entwined with selfhood. The problem of student 
disengagement becomes potentially minimized due to the fact that people’s beings are brought to bear 
instead of being discounted.  
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Of course, ontological dialogue results in a very different kind of classroom space that is marked 
by what Matusov (2009) calls a “community of learners”. A community of learners is not necessarily 
marked by studying a core domain of knowledge because it is marked by a community that takes 
dialogue seriously by virtue of seeing how it is ontological. Such a community involves honest dialogue 
where there is an ongoing testing of ideas and values against each other:  
In my view, genuine education is not about placing the students into a situation in which the student would 
accept as true voluntarily by him/herself but it is rather about helping the student consider as many alternative 
options as possible from many diverse angles (i.e. internally persuasive discourse). (p. 36).  
Where conventional knowledge is established through communal authority, understanding in dialogic 
pedagogy is established through testing in a milieu of ontological dialogue. Consider how Matusov writes:  
In contrast, dialogic pedagogy is about colliding and testing diverse ideas presented by different voices, by 
different members of a community. It involves genuine interest in each other. In dialogical pedagogy, one does 
not look for student errors but rather learns from the student how the student sees the world and him/herself. 
Disagreements between the student and the teacher are valued, respected, and expected. (2004, p. 7).  
Such practice stands in contrast to a context where the community about is not winning a debate or 
demonstrating one has knowledge aligning with authority.  Consider, for example, Kamberelis et al. 
(2105) and their discussion of a classroom engagement with literature. Instead of the teacher having a 
pre-designed agenda for a class discussion, the teacher made space for the class to enter a free 
discussion. The teacher modeled questioning and then turned the discussion over to students so that the 
teacher’s control was breached. It illustrates how texts are collaboratively produced over time in “mangles 
of practice”. As such, ontological dialogue involves a community that is continually involved in “problem 
space” (see Matusov & Miyazaki, 2014).  A community of learners therein involves a community of 
constant dialogue where questions such as the following are continually asked: Do relevant people pay 
attention? Am I or others taken seriously? Do I or others provide support to each other in the act of 
learning? Is there respect in disagreement? Is there unconditional trust? (see Matusov, 2009).  
Ontological dialogues in such communities means that subjectivities are also at stake insofar as a 
goal of dialogic pedagogy is the transforming of subjectivities within a community of learners. Matusov 
(2009) looks to Socratic teaching to show how education can involve internally persuasive dialogues that 
transform students’ subjectivities. In one way, the change to student subjectivities means realigning 
themselves to a community of learners this quality of dialogic pedagogy was noted by Shor. Consider 
how Shor writes that “I must recognize that students cannot understand their own rights because they are 
so ideologized into rejecting their own freedom, their own critical development, thanks for traditional 
curriculum” (Shor & Freire, 1987, p. 21). Good liberal arts education that is dialogical in nature “de-
socializes” people such that it is possible to break students and teachers from the conventional school 
model into which they have been socialized. Shor is interested in showing how class can become a place 
where people are de-socialized and re-socialized into a different dialogical milieu:  
The teacher is the architect of this un-doing and re-doing. The extraordinary re-experience of the ordinary 
cannot begin or proceed without the teacher’s counterstructures. This is an inspiring and awesome situation for 
teachers, who so often feel trapped in the slough of despond. So much can be gained or lost in the project of 
liberatory teaching. (Shor, 1987, p. 97). 
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In this way, the classroom can become a space where there is push back against the boundaries 
of class consciousness because students are “expelled” from the regular mode of conventional school to 
re-enter it with a critical consciousness. Lemberger (2015) expands on this idea by discussing the nature 
of dialogue. The formulation of self is not a mental process, but rather one that happens interpersonally. 
Interaction is central to any human activity and this centrality includes the constitution of subjectivities. As 
such, dialogical grammar is a deep engagement with others that results in changes to one’s subjectivity. 
Dialogue entails changes to student subjectivities that emerge in unpredictable ways contra to 
standardized learning objective like ‘develop critical thinking’.  
Students’ subjectivities are also transformed through self-reflection in dialogic pedagogy. This 
change is entwined with the way that ontological dialogue involves contestation and debate about the 
means by which people frame their world (see Hayes & Matusov, 2005). Matusov (2009) continues and 
expands on Shor’s (1987) claim that dialogicality can lead to an extraordinary experience of life when it is 
seen from a new critical stance. The former writes about Socrates’ “torpedo touch” wherein the world one 
takes for granted can be blown open through dialogue. Ontological dialogue involves a space where 
relationships and one’s taken-for-granted reality can be redefined (see also Matusov & Miyazaki, 2014). 
Hence, a community of learners involves a community that practices critical self-examination that can 
lead to self-generated critical student subjectivities (see also Matusov, 2015b).  
Another key quality of dialogic pedagogy latent in the forgoing is the reconceptualizing of the role 
of the teacher (see Matusov & Miyazaki, 2014). Shor (1987) identifies how the role of a teacher is not to 
primarily impart information because the role is more about promoting critical reflection in dialogue, as 
opposed to implementing standardized ends at the behest of bureaucratic managerial systems. Teachers 
must be sensitive to learners and listen carefully in such a way that they can be dynamically responsive to 
what they hear. A teacher may have experience and knowledge from which an exploration can begin and 
so a teacher does not naively deny what one thinks she or he knows. What demarcates a radical break 
from conventional schooling is that a teacher holds to a conviction that she or he can learn from students. 
Teacher subjectivities can also change as they are open to reconstruction. Ensuring dialogue means that 
there ought to be challenges to a teacher’s knowledge and such challenges demystify the teacher’s 
power, which requires a teacher to demonstrate competency in the course of dialogue (see Shor & Freire, 
1987). A similar theme shows up in contemporary scholarship in dialogic pedagogy where Matusov 
(2009), for example, turns a critical eye to the Socratic dialogues. The chief problem with Socrates is that 
he is never perplexed. Socrates asks leading questions that amount to faux questions where the answers 
are already known by him. His style of questioning continues into contemporary education where 
teachers engage in a triadic discursive sequence of question, student-response, and then teacher-
correction (see also Hayes & Matusov, 2005). Matusov asks: “Is it pedagogically (and morally) 
inappropriate to place a student in a situation, which forced the student to accept ‘the right option’, like 
leading-option questions do?” (2009, p. 35). Socrates and teachers of his ilk do not explain context and 
see their role as to provoke student learning without challenging one’s own position. Such practices are 
ineffective because they leave students ill-equipped when faced with real world problems and are 
unethical on the grounds that they are predicated on rigid authoritarianism. Student and teachers can 
both be educated on important issues when engage because uncertainties open up anything for 
legitimate discussion and students learn that learning is not a temporary process. 
Dialogic Pedagogy & Strong Evaluations in the Conduct of Everyday Life  
The foregoing work on the conduct of everyday life and strong evaluations resonates well with 
dialogic pedagogy. The latter fits well with the conduct of everyday life because the attempt to engage 
students’ lives and mitigate teacher authority is about the manifestation of student experience. The ethos 
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of collaborative learning and challenging social structures in dialogic pedagogy is echoed in the conduct 
of everyday life. Undoing social structures in the classroom is possible because they are constituted in 
interpersonal practices in the conduct of everyday life. Likewise, the conduct of everyday life involves 
complex social relationships where students and teachers must negotiate difficult tensions. The absence 
of a single social situation, per se, resonates well with the dialogic interplay that is so prominent in 
dialogic pedagogy. The emphasis on community of learners that test ideas in dialogic pedagogy 
consequently aligns with the complexities of a multicultural classroom like we see in the conduct of 
everyday life.  
Just like the conduct of everyday life with strong evaluations paves the way for agency, dialogic 
pedagogy does the same. Far from abstracting learning away from the communities in which people are 
participants, dialogic pedagogy makes room for the kind of communal realities that predicate strong 
evaluations. The responsibility to others and emphasis on communities necessary for the conduct of 
everyday life are integral to dialogic pedagogy. Recall how the conduct of everyday life involves strong 
evaluations that lead to changing subjectivities of students and teachers. Dialogic pedagogy also looks to 
the same kind of change and so we see an articulation of principles in dialogic pedagogy rearticulated in 
the conduct of everyday life involving strong evaluations. 
Challenges for Dialogic pedagogy 
Strong evaluations raise the issue of quality in the classroom and so raise a generative point of 
tension between dialogic pedagogy and the forgoing: the responsibility to be strong evaluators. This issue 
is a difficult one because proponents of dialogic pedagogy may raise the challenge of “whose quality”. 
After all, notions of quality are often associated with the metrics of standardized curricula. Taylor’s work 
on strong evaluations, however, raises the issue of quality without collapsing into hegemonic oppression. 
Strong evaluations are about the difference between first and second order desires. This distinction leads 
to a kind of critical self-reflection that is about contested values and ways of life and not about 
standardized content. As such, when proponents of dialogic pedagogy raise the issue of ontological 
dialogue, Taylor offers an articulation of what such ontological engagement looks like. Taylor is very clear 
that strong evaluations are about what matter to people and this resonates with ontological problem-
based learning like we see in dialogic pedagogy. The kinds of tensions that we see in the conduct of 
everyday life involving strong evaluations fits well with the kind of dialogue we see in dialogic pedagogy, 
but they open up the potential of two challenges to dialogic pedagogy.  
Challenge 1: Disengagement 
I want to address a challenge that we need to bear in mind as we move forward in our work in 
dialogic pedagogy and this challenge is the threat of disengaged individualism. This threat ties into what I 
mentioned above in reference to how education that seeks student engagement can do so on the 
grounds of weak evaluations. When Taylor (1989) traces the development of the kind of self we see in 
modern individualism, he fleshes out in more detail how people are set up to fall into weak evaluations. 
My position is that education is not insulated from this propensity. 
Individualistic self-responsibility is one feature of the contemporary conduct of everyday life that 
enables disengagement. Taylor writes that the  
philosophy of disengagement and objectification has helped to create a picture of the human being, at its most 
extreme in certain forms of materialism, from which the last vestiges of subjectivity seem to have been expelled. 
It is a picture of the human being from a completely third-person perspective. (1989, pp. 175-176).  
Disengagement, Pedagogical Eros and (the undoing of?) Dialogic pedagogy  





Dialogic Pedagogy: An International Online Journal | http://dpj.pitt.edu 
DOI: 10.5195/dpj.2016.182 | Vol. 4 (2016) 
 
E39 
This third-person perspective refers to the rational and objective control and view of oneself and life. It is 
about a Cartesian struggle or pull one’s rational capacities away from the distractions of the body that 
include emotions and other such ‘irrational’ experience. One gains self-mastery through reason 
abstracted from life and therein one is able to shape oneself through deliberate rational. One is 
responsible to disengage from the attachments in everyday life and shape a self-hood grounded in pure 
logic. This rational control of the self is an idea that lies in our tacit consciousness of individual self-
responsibility. Descartes and Kant set the stage for this perspective and, in reference to moral ontologies, 
as [Kant] puts it later: other things have a price, only rational agents have dignity (Würde). In a sense, our 
obedience to moral law is simply the respect that this dignity commands from us. The sources of good are 
within. (Taylor, 1989, p. 365).  
Sources of good are not treated as socio-linguistic or communally constituted because they are found in 
the responsibility of an individual to pursue logic. 
Such individualistic self-responsibility that we see permeating late-modern societies amounts to 
an untenable disengagement. Taylor (1999) elaborates on the problem with individualistic self-
responsibility ten years after Sources of the Self and explains why it amounts to disengagement. He does 
so by challenging another Cartesian: Jean-Paul Sartre and the latter’s discussion of radically free choice. 
Sartre’s claim was that we need to strip ourselves of attachments to be radically free and make decisions 
about what is right to do. Taylor’s critique is that we cannot understand our responsibility for our 
evaluations through the notion of radical choice. He presents Sartre’s discussion of a young man during 
the second world war who wants to simultaneously leave home to fight for the French resistance and stay 
home to care for a sick mother.  Sartre, in saying the young man needs to become detached to make a 
choice, is wrong according to Taylor. It is only a difficult situation precisely because the options are not 
created by rational choice. An agent of radical choice has to choose like the simple weigher because 
there is no conception of a ‘pull’ possessed by either option. The real force of the dilemma comes from 
the sense that there are different moral perspectives entailed in strong evaluations: 
When we see what makes the theory of radical choice plausible, we see how strong evaluation is something 
inescapable in our conception of the agent and his experience; and this because it is bound up with our notion 
of the self (1999, p. 33).  
To lose these qualities is to lose the very possibility of being an agent who evaluates. An agent of radical 
choice has no horizon of evaluation and it is for this reason that a perfect detachable consciousness that 
deals with issues that matter is an illusion - a dangerous illusion, because it denies life itself, and others 
as people to whom one is answerable.  
Particularity is another feature of the contemporary conduct of everyday enables disengagement. 
Where one part of the conduct of contemporary everyday life involves self-responsibility and individuality 
emerging from Descartes’ call for radical disengagement from ordinary experience, Taylor notes how 
Montaigne requires deeper engagement with one’s own particularity. Previous eras and philosophies 
were concerned with finding universal human nature and looking within oneself to find such 
commonalities. There was a shift following the radical enlightenment from looking within oneself for 
universal human nature to looking within oneself to find one’s own being. Self-knowledge particular to 
oneself becomes important after expressionism as Taylor writes:  
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What is new in the post-expressivist era is that the domain is within, that is, it is only open to a mode of 
exploration that involves a first-person stance. That is what it means to define the voice or impulse as ‘inner’. … 
The sense of depth in inner space is bound up with the sense that we can move into it and bring things to the 
fore. (1989, pp. 389-390).  
The idea is that we “have” particular selves in the same way that we have a body part that is uniquely 
ours.  Interiority and passion of self comes from radical interiority of this sort that puts us in a state of 
tension. On the one hand, we conduct contemporary individualist life with an ethos of Cartesian 
individuality and disengagement. The Cartesian disengagement entailed in self-responsibility/individuality 
means to disconnect from the experiential qualities of everyday life that are essential for strong 
evaluations. On the other hand, we deeply engage ourselves to explore our own passions and desires 
that we hide even from ourselves. Even though late modern subjectivities are paradoxical, particularity 
nevertheless means a more robust disengagement from others and the communities in which we live. 
This problematic perspective means that self dissolves in a void, without boundaries in its individualist 
isolation. Taylor is pointing out how people can miss important parts of their relationships with others and 
not arguing that people are missing a connection with some sort of higher community consciousness. 
Delving into one’s own passions can run the risk of missing how others offer important boundaries and 
relational touch points that help shape our selves. Overall, he is warning that the wider contexts of and 
webs of relations that ground strong evaluations are displaced in favor of one’s particular self-exploration. 
Personal commitment is a third feature of the contemporary conduct of everyday life that enables 
disengagement. This feature refers to a radical shift that took place in terms of commitment to spiritual 
practices and alignment with some sort of moral or cosmic order. Whereas commitment to such universal 
orders was the vocation of elites such as priests or aesthetes, the enlightenment and renaissance lead to 
a call for all persons to make such commitments. In tandem with self-responsibility/individuality and 
particularity, this change means that personal commitment is not to a theory of cosmic logos. It is not just 
the elite who were committed to the faith but all people must commit deeply and the thing to which one 
become committed is oneself. What comes from this transition is the social leveling as ‘higher’ activities 
come under vigorous criticism. Social leveling in the value of everyday life can be seen in the interest in 
everyday life in the art and literature. Taylor writes that  
This three-sided individualism is central to our modern identity. It has helped fix that sense of self which gives 
off the illusion of being anchored in our very being, perennial and independent of interpretation. … the growth of 
forms of inwardness, correlative of the increasing centrality of reflexivity in spiritual life, and the consequent 
displacement of moral sources. But what may seem to common sense even more basic and unchallengeable is 
the location in general of the properties and nature of something ‘in’ that thing, and in particular, the location of 
thought ‘in’ the mind. … Thought and feeling – the psychological – are now confined to minds. (1989, pp. 185-
186).  
Hence, there is the emergence of the ethic of being true to oneself and personally committing to holding 
to such individualistic truth. The result is a disengaged individualism that focusses on oneself in denying 
higher callings, which reduces human motivation to pleasure and weak evaluations. Hence, it compounds 
disengagement by precluding strong evaluations.  
Taylor’s (1989) discussion of late-modern subjectivities illustrates how dialogic pedagogy – 
especially in North America – is challenged by a propensity of students to fall back into disengagement. 
Individualistic self-responsibility, particularity, and personal commitment are likely to be present forces in 
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the classroom. The radical restructuring and freedom we seek to promote in dialogic pedagogy makes it 
easy for students who are all-too-ready to fall back into disengagement, which therein undermines 
dialogue. It is clear that conventional education forces students into a kind of alienation from the 
classroom, either through weak evaluative style or obsession with external trappings of ‘success’ like 
grades. My concern is that a dialogic classroom does not necessarily provide an easy antidote. Students 
can potentially transition from a very monologic, authoritarian pedagogical regime, into an open, 
democratic regime, and require “detoxification” from the mangles of totalitarianism. This would be a period 
of time where they can do nothing by obligation. Disengagement could be a particular circumstance of 
transitioning from an authoritarian to a democratic educational governance regime.  
There is a path between two extremes that, I think, we need to navigate dialogic pedagogy. 
Practitioners of dialogic pedagogy may attempt to undo alienation from standardization, but as Shor 
(1987) intimated, they dispositionally fall back into presupposed tacit ideologies of disengagement. The 
path of least resistance is a danger to dialogic pedagogy and dialogue in the classroom because such 
disengagement we see in some wider communities – a disengagement promoted by neoliberal 
machinations that need docile adherents. It is not just with school, but the conduct of everyday life is 
potentially marked by personal commitment to an individualist modus operandi that precludes dialogue. It 
could well be that many students are dispositionally oriented towards weak evaluations and dialogic 
pedagogy may be just another first-order option in which this happens. After all, we cannot compel 
engagement and have a dialogic climate in a classroom. 
Challenge 2: Pedagogical Eros 
While, on the one hand, I described above the challenge of disengagement, on the other hand, 
there is a converse issue: engagement that entails eros. Plato’s Symposium involves a discussion of love 
and simultaneously reflects on education. It contains a speech by Alcibiades, who fancies himself to be 
Socrates’ pupil and his speech illuminates a challenge to dialogic pedagogy:  
The first time a person lets himself listen to one of Socrates’ arguments, it sounds ridiculous. … But if you could 
see them opened up, if you can get through to what’s under the surface, what you will find is that his arguments 
are the only ones in the world that make sense. And that’s not all: under the surface his arguments abound with 
divinity and effigies of goodness. They turn out to be extremely far reaching, or rather the cover absolutely 
everything which needs to be taken into consideration on the path to true goodness (Plato & Waterfield, 2008, 
p. 69).  
The hyperbole in Alcibiades’ comment illustrates how there can be students who ontologically engage in 
pedagogy and have this kind of awakening where ideas come alive to them. They can come alive to the 
ideas of a pedagogue in a dangerous way where a teacher’s voice eclipses all others like we see in this 
excerpt from the speech. This change can happen at all levels of pedagogy and it is a powerful 
experience because of the ontological quality of strong evaluations.  
What often comes with such change is a complex kind of eroticism – one that goes beyond mere 
sex – and Alcibiades is deeply impacted by his love for Socrates. Part of this eroticism is seen in how 
viscerally Alcibiades describes his experience:  
In fact, I’ve been bitten by something with far more excruciating bite than a snake, and it couldn’t have attacked 
a more vulnerable part of me. My heart or mind … has been struck and bitten by philosophy, and when 
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philosophy seizes a young man of caliber, it clings more fiercely than any snake and makes him do all sorts of 
things. (Plato & Waterfield, 2008, p. 64).  
Themes of masochistic eroticism permeate Alcibiades’ speech as he describes the influence that 
Socrates has had on him. The masochistic eroticism is not the only way that Socrates sees pedagogical 
eros taking shape. Of course, Plato’s obsession with the ideal type of love lurks in the background of this 
speech and reinforces that pedagogical eros is not just about sex: it is about an ideal kind of love. It is 
possible to move away from the hegemony of the ideal forms while taking the cue that we are not just 
talking about eros in a shallow sense. It is a richer concept involving broad desire and affection. Steiner 
(2003) discusses the Symposium at length and points out how people love or hate Socrates as they come 
under the spell of the master. Eroticism is interwoven with the phenomenology of mastery and 
discipleship and Steiner argues that education involves the “totalities of the mind and body [being] 
enlisted” in education (p. 26). Class can generate an “atmosphere saturated with tensions of the heart” (p. 
27). Thirst for dialogue creates the penetrative tenderness of mastery and discipleship. The Symposium 
describes love in relation to education and Socrates’ discussion of love starts from a discussion of how to 
love something is to desire it insofar as it is something not in one’s possession that one desires. 
Pedagogical eros therein includes desire of something else that one sees in another. In the case of 
Alcibiades, it is the learned quality of Socrates that he wants. There is a deep identification between the 
instructor and the pupil as the pupil wants something the instructor has. There is something attractive in 
Socrates’ knowledge that Alcibiades desires and it is the far reaching quality of Socrates’ understanding. 
To phrase this in terms of the conduct of everyday life and strong evaluations, it is the opening up of 
critical consciousness that we see becomes possible in ontological dialogues. 
Steiner’s (2003) position is that education is, on the one hand, a journey where students and 
pedagogues move together through life. A teacher gives an example through living as “[e]xemplary 
teaching is enactment and can be mute” as “Socrates and the saints teach by existing.” (ibid. p. 4).  
Education is therein a journey where to educate means to lead forth together through strong evaluations 
in the conduct of everyday life. This journey amounts to a partnership between the master and the pupil is 
the axis of journey. Just as Dante is lead through hell with his teacher, Virgil, Steiner argues that 
educators walk with their students through the difficulties of hell – i.e. the existential angst of strong 
evaluations. Students progressively move away from the master as they go from hell to heaven, which 
means that the teacher takes students through the struggle of initial strong evaluations and they move on 
to managing such radical reflexivity on their own.  
Eros is important to engagement, but not all teachers are the same in terms of their relationships 
with students as we see in hooks’ (1993, 2003) discussion of eros and the potential for violence that we 
saw in the Symposium. She, like Steiner and Plato, sees eros as an essential part of the classroom 
because  
[u]nderstanding that eros is a force that enhances our overall effort to be self-actualizing, that it can provide an 
epistemological grounding informing how we know what we know, enables both professors and students to use 
such energy in a classroom setting in ways that invigorate discussion and excite critical imagination. (1993, p. 
60).  
Self-actualizing pertains to the identification and development that comes with engagement in strong 
evaluations. The epistemological grounding that hooks writes about is that our ontological engagement 
entwines with how we know how to live in everyday life. We often feel our way through life and relations 
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with others and education is not unique insofar as it is not neutral objective ground. Special bonds and 
affection have always existed in the pedagogical relationships. Moreover, instructors are instructed to 
bring love and passion to the classroom and there is substantial force directing faculty to go beyond the 
mere transmission of information in their pedagogy. She resonates with the forgoing by arguing that 
people enter the classroom as embodied and feeling agents who are holistic beings. Paradoxically, such 
discussion of the body is simultaneously a betrayal of the legacy of denial and repression of the body in 
favor of abstract logic. hooks sees such a betrayal as a good thing because it is absurd to deny eros in 
the classroom implied in holding to an artificial split between private/passionate personal lives and 
public/dispassionate public lives. Such a dichotomy becomes irrelevant when there is an honest 
acknowledgement of eros in the classroom. Her claim is that we must live with eros and move beyond it 
as just sexual if we are to deal with the potential for violence inherent in it.  
It is here how, on the other hand, there is a dark side to pedagogical eros and the journey taken 
by students and teachers. The dark side is the inevitable realities of power relations and Steiner (2003) 
identifies how teaching is an exercise in power relations. Consider how he writes that, at times,  
[t]o teach something is to lay hands on what is most vital in a human being … A master invades, he breaks 
open, he can lay waste in order to cleanse and rebuild. Poor teaching, pedagogic routine, a style of instruction 
which is consciously or not, cynical in its merely utilitarian aims, are ruinous. They tear up hope by its roots. Bad 
teaching is, almost literally, murderous and, metaphorically, a sin. It diminishes the student, it reduces to gray 
inanity the subject being presented. (p. 18).  
He also writes how a “charismatic master, an inspired ‘prof’ take in hand, in a radically ‘totalitarian’ 
psychosomatic grasp, the living spirit of their students or disciples.” (p. 27). This experience certainly does 
not mark all students to such a degree. It is, however, indicative of the kind of destructive power that a 
teacher can have in light of the erotic energy entailed in teaching. Cynical dialogue that undermines 
metanarrative can tear students up and leave them in states of despair. Crushing relativism that a critical 
consciousness raises can lead to perpetual strangeness from life as usual. Cynical deconstruction can 
leverage eros to a destructive end where students give up. Hence, Steiner writes about how teaching 
involves love and the darkness of love, which is when the erotic and abstention that leads to strangeness 
and more alienation. There is a tremendous potentiality for violence entwined with pedagogical eros when 
there is student engagement.  
hooks (2003) is clear that the dark side of pedagogical eros can be seen in abuse of power by faculty. 
While there can be positive erotic bonds between an instructor and students, it can be violent and 
exploitive. Hence there are college policies prohibiting relationships that have even an erotic veneer. She 
points out that there are faculty who should not be tolerated and these are the ones that need power 
imbalances to “get it up and keep it up” (ibid., p. 148). Since student development can be the context 
where erotic longings occur, passionate pedagogy spawns erotic energy that can be misused. Steiner 
(2003) notes that “Schoolmasters, trainers of mind and body, aware of what is at stake, of the interplay of 
trust and vulnerability, of the organic fusion between responsibility and response (what I will call 
answerability) are alarmingly few.” (p. 18). What he and hooks are driving at is that unreflective 
exploitation is not the kind of pedagogical eros that realizes good pedagogy. Barring such exploitive 
actors but allowing for eros means that desire can be acknowledged among unequal partners that is non-
abusive and a community of learners can test relationships like all other aspects of education. Instead 
undermining students as being impotent through representing them as having no choice, eros can be 
acknowledged and be part of exploring how people learn to be just in situations of power imbalance. That 
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is, it is possible to hold people accountable instead of precluding recognition of accountability and 
responsibility when deny erotic feelings that emerge between teacher and students. 
The kind of community of learners that dialogic pedagogy promotes sets up conditions for 
pedagogical eros to emerge. In one very basic way, dialogic pedagogy sets up the conditions for eros 
with the erosion of boundaries that were sustained through conventional education. When students and 
teachers are equalized and there is an erosion of conventional boundaries, it is easier for eros to emerge. 
The boundaries around relationships also likely erode and pave the way for more eroticism in education. 
The point is that there is no dispassionate engagement when one is ontologically engaged in dialogical 
pedagogy.  
Furthermore, a community of learners sets up the condition for eros because students who 
engage in ontological eros are put in a place where traditional forms of telos are eroded. The ethos of 
ontological dialogue entails strong evaluations that are not immediately resolved, which is the case in 
terms of weak evaluations. Strong evaluations in the conduct of everyday life create a climate where 
traditional sources of authority become relativized and finding personal direction becomes existentially 
tougher. As teachers open up space for more strong evaluations in dialogical pedagogy, they open up 
new understandings and a richer conduct of everyday life. Such change means that the conduct of 
everyday life involves heightened engagement and critical self-reflection that we seek to see in a 
community of learners. It is a conduct of everyday educational life that opens up ontologically pervasive 
strong evaluations.  
This experience can be tough to students and it leads to erotic desire and so Steiner (2003) 
writes about how teaching involves love and the darkness of love, which is when the erotic and abstention 
that can lead to alienation from the life before what dialogic pedagogy would consider ontological 
dialogue. Eros is entwined with a desire for what someone else has and, in this case, it is the experience 
of being a strong evaluator. A teacher seems to live a life that an engaged student desires and the issue 
of eros needs to be discussed in dialogic pedagogy. The teacher-student relationship needs to be 
discussed because the eros it entails can lead to a subversion of dialogue.  
The importance of the student-teacher relationship and equality that is pursued in dialogic 
pedagogy means that we need to face the issue of pedagogical eros. There is the issue of the dark side 
of eros where abuses can happen. Dialogic pedagogy needs to address how such abuse is understood 
and defined in ways other than shallow harassment-prevention policies that we see in bureaucratic 
schooling. This direction means talking about the admission and negotiation of power in ways that are 
non-abusive, yet do not suppress or overly sexualize pedagogical eros. How do we understand the 
flourishing of healthy dialogue in light of pedagogical eros? Considering this question means that taking a 
strong stance on the incidental quality of the teacher may be more complicated than is currently 
presumed in dialogic pedagogy. The complexities of relationships need to be careful discussed because it 
is not so easy to dismiss the special role of the teacher and sustain ontological dialogue.  
Concluding… Not! 
In this editorial, I drew on my background and recent experience with DPJ to lay out the 
groundwork for two issues I’d like to see discussed in the area of dialogic pedagogy. Namely, 
disengagement and pedagogical eros are two issues that I argued for addressing. Scholarship on the 
conduct of everyday life opens up a new area for readers interested in dialogic pedagogy. Its emphasis 
on the first person stance and the issues of power in relation to resistance provide generative material for 
discussion. I added the notion of strong evaluations because I have been struggling for a while with how 
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to talk about quality without hegemony. Strong evaluations are dynamic and they allow us to talk about 
quality in education without falling prey to monologism or neoliberal consumer anesthesia.  These genres 
of scholarship both resonate and challenge dialogic pedagogy, which is what we ought to do in DPJ.  
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I have often struggled with Bakhtin’s claim in the Speech Genres essay that a written piece of 
work is a single utterance in a chain. This article is populated with so many voices that I find this claim 
hard to accept. I am indebted to the other editors of Dialogic Pedagogy Journal for reviews of an earlier 
draft, which has led to the inclusion of their voices. Thanks should be extended to them for support and 
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